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Globalization has renewed interest in the place and role of cities in
the international system. Recent literature proposes that the fate of
cities (and their residents) has become increasingly tied to their po-
sition in international ﬂows of investment and trade. Data on the
branch locations of the world’s 500 largest multinational enterprises
in 2000 are subjected to two broad types of network analytic tech-
niques in order to analyze the “world city system.” First, 3,692 cities
are analyzed in terms of three measures of point centrality. Second,
blockmodeling techniques are employed to generalize further about
the positions and roles played by cities in the system. These tech-
niques are used to trace out the structure of the world city system,
locate cities in the context of a global urban hierarchy, and explore
the degree to which this diverges from a simple one-to-one matching
of cities onto nation-states in the world system.
The phenomenon of globalization has renewed interest in thinking about
cities as loci of action in the world system. Recent literature proposes that
cities have become increasingly decoupled from local (i.e., regional or
national) political geography as the salience of their position in interna-
tional networks of investment and trade has grown (Friedmann 1986;
Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 2001). Globalization is argued to be gen-
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annual meeting in St. Louis, October 2002; the American Sociological Association
annual meeting in Anaheim, Calif., August 2001; and the workshop “Global Processes
and Inequality” organized by the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of
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and Doug White for their comments and assistance. This research was supported by
a grant to the ﬁrst author from the World Society Foundation.Directallcorrespondence
to Arthur S. Alderson, Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Ballantine Hall
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erating a new geography of centrality and marginality that cuts across
the old core/periphery, North/South, and East/West divides in the world
system (Sassen 1994, p. 4). In particular, developments of the past few
decades are seen as producing a new global hierarchy of cities, at the apex
of which are located what have variously been referred to as “world cities”
(Friedmann 1986) or “global cities” (Sassen 2001). Such cities constitute
the key nodes or command points that exercise power over other cities
in a system of cities and, thus, the world economy.
To date, research on world cities and on the structure of the larger
world city system has tended toward the impressionistic. In large part,
this is attributable to the paucity of data appropriate to a rigorous ex-
ploration of the structure of the world city system (Smith and Timberlake
1995a; Taylor, Walker, and Beaverstock 2002). For Short et al. (1996), this
state of affairs constitutes the “dirty little secret” of world city research:
“Few of the many papers on the global urban system draw upon original
data; common hypotheses are repeated rather than tested and most draw
upon the assumptions of previous papers. The dominance of London,
New York, and Tokyo, for example, is more often asserted than dem-
onstrated” (p. 668). Moreover, when data are assembled with the aim of
locating individual cities in a global urban hierarchy, they typicallyconsist
of information such as counts of corporate headquarters or banks, rank-
ings of cities in terms of population or air passenger trafﬁc, or the location
of stock markets, Olympic Games, or even Rolling Stones concerts (Short
et al. 1996). While such data are in some instances the best available and
can yield real insights (e.g., Chase-Dunn 1985; Chase-Dunn and Manning
1999), they are less than ideal. For instance, researchers utilizing counts
of corporate headquarters to identify and rank world cities (e.g., Abbott
1997; Cohen 1981; Godfrey and Zhou 1999; Lyons and Salmon 1995;
Meijer 1993) must simply assume that such attributional data reﬂect the
character of relations with other cities in the world city system (Smith
and Timberlake 1993, p. 197). Researchers, in other words, must assume
what they set out to establish: cities are situated in a “system,” and some
cities—as a result of the position that they occupy in this system—are
better situated than others.
One way out of this trap is to build on the strong afﬁnity between the
literature on world cities and social network analysis, as Smith and Tim-
berlake have repeatedly noted (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2002). As conceptu-
alized in the literature, the power of world cities is inherently relational:
cities do not have power in and of themselves; they have power to the
extent that they function as command points and centers of planning and
thus establish the framework in which other cities operate in the world
economy. Similarly, social network analysts suggest that power is best
viewed as a consequence of patterns of social relations that generate op-World City System
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portunities and constraints: some actors are favored because they occupy
positions that are more favorable than others (Granovetter 1973; Padgett
and Ansell 1993; Guiffre 1999). Moreover, network analysts have devel-
oped a set of tools that enable those interested in pursuing the world city
hypothesis to assess (1) the degree of power wielded by individual cities
and (2) the positions of and roles played by different types of cities within
the world city system.
Smith and Timberlake (1993, p. 197) characterize this potentiallyhappy
mating of theory and method as a “perfect marriage.” Unfortunately, few
researchers have pursued this union. The key exceptions include David
Meyer’s (1986) exploration of the dominance of core ﬁnancial centers(e.g.,
London, New York, and Tokyo) over South American cities through the
medium of international bank ofﬁces and Smith and Timberlake’s(1995b,
2001, 2002; see also Shin and Timberlake 2000) own pioneering work on
air travel among Friedmann’s (1986) world cities.
2 In this article we take
up Smith and Timberlake’s call for more network-oriented analysis and
take another step toward mapping the contemporary world city system.
Our approach differs from Meyer’s and Smith and Timberlake’s in that
we focus on what we view as a key relation linking cities into a world
system of cities: that between multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their
subsidiaries.
3 Our data consist of information on the headquarter and
branch locations of the world’s 500 largest multinational ﬁrms in 2000.
The data are coded as directional (i.e., distinguishing between senders
and receivers) and valued (i.e., allowing multiple ties between cities). This
produces a matrix linking 3,692 cities across the globe. In this article, we
assess thepowerof world citiesin lightofthreemeasuresofpointcentrality
(namely, outdegree, closeness, and betweenness). As the world city hy-
pothesis suggests that choices received are important, we also assess the
prestige of world cities as the indegree of each city. Having established a
ranking of world cities in terms of network centrality, we then employ
blockmodeling techniques to assess the regular equivalencebetweencities.
Blockmodeling techniques enable us to abstract from information about
individual cities and generalize about the nature of relations between
2 In his admirable work on U.S. cities, Christopher Ross (1987, 1992) has done similar
research that joins network analysis to the traditional human-ecological concern with
metropolitan dominance (e.g., Duncan et al. 1960; Hawley 1950).
3 Smith and Timberlake’s (1995a, p. 86) typology of intercity linkages identiﬁes 12
families of relations. While all these relations could be usefully explored, the literature
on world cities typically identiﬁes the multinational enterprise as a central agent in
the generation of the world city system. Nonetheless, it bears emphasizing that there
are important cultural, social, and political dimensions to “world city–ness,” and the
question of the degree to which they are isomorphic to the economic remains an open
one.American Journal of Sociology
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positions in the world city system and the roles played by different types
of cities in that system.
The questions that we address in this paper are concrete. First, while
numerous rankings of world cities have been proposed, few have utilized
the sorts of relational data necessary to ﬁrmly establish such rankings
empirically. Thus one aim is simply to determine which cities are in fact
central to the MNE-generated city system. Second, having established a
ranking of world cities in terms of network centrality, we then examine
precisely what sort of “system” these cities form. Is it one composed of
cohesive subgroups, bounded, perhaps, by region along the lines of re-
gional trading blocks? Is it a core/periphery system? A simple hierarchy?
And what roles are played by different types of cities within this system?
Finally, if globalization is indeed generating a new geography of centrality
and marginality, this should be reﬂected in slippage between the map of
the world city system and established maps of the world system (e.g.,
Snyder and Kick 1979; Bollen 1983; Nemeth and Smith 1985; Smith and
White 1992). We thus explore the degree to which the power and position
of cities in the world city system deviate from a one-to-one matching of
cities onto nation-states in the world system.
WORLD CITY HYPOTHESES
Three decades ago, Stephen Hymer (1972) was assigned the task of pro-
ducing an essay that would look forward to the turn of the 21st century.
While Hymer is primarily known for his inﬂuential work on the multi-
national enterprise, the paper that he produced is remarkable for the
degree to which it anticipates contemporary thinking on the implications
of globalization for processes of urbanization.
4 Extrapolating from trends
in the organization of business since the Industrial Revolution, Hymer
speculated on what increasing “multinationalization” of the world econ-
omy would mean for cities:
[It would] tend to produce a hierarchical division of labor between geo-
graphical regions corresponding to the vertical division of labor within the
ﬁrm. It would tend to centralize high-level decision-making occupations in
a few key cities in the advanced countries, surrounded by a number of
regional sub-capitals, and conﬁne the rest of the world to lower levels of
4 As noted below, most contemporary research on the world city system takes its lead
from Friedmann, who appears to have been unaware of Hymer’s work. He credits
Castells (1972) and Harvey (1973) with initiating the change in thinking on cities that
his own work has advanced and suggests that it was not until the 1980s that “the
study of cities [was] directly connected to the world economy” (Friedmann 1986, p.
69).World City System
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activity and income, i.e., to the status of towns and villages in the new
Imperial system. Income, status, authority, and consumption patternswould
radiate out from these centers along a declining curve, and the existing
pattern of inequality and dependency would be perpetuated. The pattern
would be complex, just as the structure of the corporation is complex, but
the basic relationship between different countries would be one of superior
and subordinate, head ofﬁce and branch plant. (Hymer 1972, p. 114)
Joining location theory to Chandler and Redlich’s (1961) classic dis-
tinction of three levels of management, Hymer (1972) predicted that the
structure of the world city system would come to reﬂect the structure of
the modern multinational ﬁrm. With increasing internationalization, the
activities associated with the day-to-day operations of the ﬁrm will spread
across the globe. One result would be the diffusion of industrialization to
developing countries and the creation of new centers of productionoutside
the highly industrialized core of the world economy. “Midlevel” activities
associated primarily with the coordination of managers at the ﬁrst level
will tend to be more geographically concentrated. As their demands are
similar (e.g., the need for white-collar labor, communication, and infor-
mation), such activities will tend to cluster across industries in the same
midlevel cities. Activities at the highest level, those involving goal setting
and planning, will grow even more concentrated, driven by the need for
face-to-face interaction at the highest levels of decision making and the
need to be near capital markets, government, and media.
To the extent that this correspondence between the centralization of
control within the ﬁrm and the world economy grows, geographical spe-
cialization will come to reﬂect the hierarchy of corporate decision making.
By the end of the 20th century, Hymer (1972) thought that power in the
world economy would become even more concentrated in the hands of
multinationals sited in a small number of cities located in core countries
and thus foresaw the emergence of a world city system dominated by
such traditional powers as New York, London, Paris, and Tokyo.
5 The
structure of income and consumption would likewise come to reﬂect the
structure of status and authority: The “best” jobs would concentrate in
or near the major centers, which would transform centers of planning
into centers of product innovation and high-status consumption as well.
In contrast to some later thinking on globalization and the city, the idea
that the consolidation of the “regime of multinational corporations” might
create opportunities for upward mobility within the urban hierarchy for
previously underdeveloped regions is rejected. Instead, globalization
would likely reperipheralize the underdeveloped world—albeit within a
5 Hymer (1972, p. 124) also offers that Moscow and “perhaps” Beijing would attain
the status of world city by the year 2000.American Journal of Sociology
816
modiﬁed framework—as indigenous centers of planning and control,
along with former centers of extraction and colonial/neocolonial admin-
istration, are transformed into “branch plant” cities. While alteration of
the global urban hierarchy is likely (e.g., the emergence of new centers
of production in the South and the simultaneous decline of old centers of
production in the North), Hymer predicted that the map of the world city
system by century’s end would match rather closely established maps of
the world system.
While Hymer’s (1972) essay has been widely cited, most contemporary
research on the world city system takes its lead from John Friedmann
(1986), whose statement of the world city hypothesis consists of a series
of generalizations regarding urbanization in the context of globalization:
1. The form and extent of a city’s integration with the world economy,
and the functions assigned to the city in the new spatial division of
labour, will be decisive for any structural changes occurring within
it.
2. Key cities throughout the world are used by global capital as “basing
points” in the spatial organization and articulation of production
and markets. The resulting linkages make it possible to arrange
world cities into a complex spatial hierarchy.
3. The global control functions of world cities are directly reﬂected in
the structure and dynamics of their production sectors and
employment.
4. World cities are major sites for the concentration and accumulation
of international capital.
5. World cities are points of destination for large numbers of both
domestic and/or international migrants.
6. World city formation brings into focus the major contradictions of
industrial capitalism—among them spatial and class polarization.
7. World city growth generates social costs at rates that tend to exceed
the ﬁscal capacity of the state.
6
Friedmann’s world city hypothesis has been credited with opening up
a new way of asking questions about cities, one that situates the city in
the context of the development of capitalism rather than the general prin-
ciples of human ecology (Knox 1996). However, as Friedmann (1995) has
stressed, it is more than simply a heuristic. It should also be read as a set
of statements about a class of cities with speciﬁable attributes.First,world
cities play a distinct role in the articulation of regional, national, and
6 These seven items are quoted verbatim from Friedmann’s (1986, pp. 70–77) article,
where they appear as section headings.World City System
817
international economies into a global economy: “They serve as the or-
ganizing nodes of a global economic system” (p. 25). World cities are ﬁrst
and foremost centers. As centers they have power, linking the ﬁelds that
they are central to into the world economy. Second, the regional, national,
and international ﬁelds that are articulated by world cities are, when
summed, smaller than the world as a whole. Any number of regions (and
populations) around the world may be isolates with respect to the world
city system. Third, the boundaries of world cities are not deﬁned by
administrative or political criteria, but by patterns of interaction. As such,
suburbs and the near hinterland should in many instances be conceptu-
alized as integral parts of the larger urbanized region (Sudjik 1992).
Fourth, world cities can be arrayed in a hierarchy on the basis of the
economic power that they command. Cities of the ﬁrst rank are those that
serve as the “command and control centers of the global economy” (p.
23). Below these stand cities that articulate the economies of multiple
nations into the world economy and, lower still, those that articulate
national and subnational (regional) economies. Finally, the world city
system generates a social class—“the transnational capitalist class”—that
is described as sharing common economic interests, a common culture of
cosmopolitanism, and a common ideology of consumerism.
Friedmann’s (1995) expectations regarding the morphology of theworld
city system are thus quite clear. Globalization is generating a new urban
hierarchy. The cities that stand at its peak are those that are most central
to the ﬂow of “economically relevant variables” (p. 22). Below these stand
cities that tie otherwise isolate regions into the world economy. Within
this latter group there are gradations of rank that reﬂect variation in the
breadth of the area articulated (i.e., multinational, national, and subna-
tional). Large swaths of the world operate outside of the orbit of the world
city system. In sharp contrast to the monism of certain brands of neo-
Marxian thinking (e.g., dependency and world-systems theory), Fried-
mann suggests that globalization has excluded a large proportion of the
world’s population and is rendering the traditional capitalist periphery
economically irrelevant.
7 Where Hymer (1972) saw globalization gener-
ating a fairly static urban hierarchy dominated by traditional powers,
7 The world map is one of “a core space articulated by a small number of regional
control centers and a fragmented marginalized periphery” (Friedmann 1995, p. 41).
Regarding Brazil and Peru, for instance, Friedmann writes that “Sa ˜o Paulo and the
afﬂuent metropolitan classes of Brazil do not require the country’s disempowered poor
either as producers or consumers. In this sense, I would argue, more than 50 per cent
of Brazil’s population is economically irrelevant and, at worst, constitutes a drain on
the economy (welfare, police, prisons). Still, civil order is being preserved in Brazil.
This is not Peru’s story, however. Lacking a Sa ˜o Paulo, that country of 22 million has
been excluded wholesale from the global space of accumulation” (p. 41).American Journal of Sociology
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Friedmann (1995) characterizes the world city system as a dynamic hi-
erarchy with ranks and entrance criteria that are, in principle, open: To
the extent that cities can attract investment and capture more of the
command and control functions of the world economy, their status in the
urban hierarchy will improve. While there is every expectation that cities
such as New York, London, and Tokyo will emerge as cities of the ﬁrst
rank in any empirical analysis, “cities may rise into the ranks of world
cities, they may drop from the order, and they may rise or fall in rank”
(Friedmann 1995, p. 26). This opens up the possibility of substantial
slippage between the map of the contemporary world city system and
established maps of the world system. The new urban hierarchygenerated
by globalization may cut across the traditional core/periphery, North/
South, and East/West divides in the world system.
8
Saskia Sassen’s (2001) version of the world city hypothesis has also had
an important inﬂuence on empirical research on the world city system
(e.g., Beaverstock, Taylor, and Smith 1999; Taylor et al. 2002). Sassen’s
account stresses the novelty of the “complex duality” presently driving
processes of urbanization, that of the “spatially dispersed, yet globally
integrated organization of economic activity” (2001, p. 3). While global-
ization has resulted in the dispersion of many day-to-day secondary sector
activities (e.g., the decline of old centers of production in the North), it
has not been accompanied by any corresponding decentralization of con-
trol. Instead, control has become even more centralized. The fundamental
dynamic, Sassen suggests, is that “the more globalized the economy be-
comes, the higher the agglomeration of central functions in a relatively
few sites, that is, the global cities” (p. 5).
While sharing much in common with Hymer (1972) and Friedmann
(1986), Sassen’s (2001) approach is distinctive for the extent to which it
problematizes power in the world city system. The case studies of New
York, Tokyo, and London presented in The Global City focus less on the
8 While Friedmann’s (1995) image of the world system—that of a densely connected
archipelago situated in the blank space of exclusion—stresses the unity of interests of
the “transnational capitalist class,” other possibilities have been suggested. Research
on the formation of blocks in the world economy questions the degree to which the
world is moving toward a decentralized multilateral world trading system, suggesting
instead that the world economy can be subdivided into quasi-exclusive subgroups or
factions—“blocks” (e.g., Junne 1999; Blanton 1999). Research on rising eastern hegem-
ony (e.g., Arrighi 1994; Frank 1998) contends that we are in the midst of an important
shift in power in the world system from West to East. While such issues are not
typically addressed in research on world cities, examination of the structure of the
world city system provides a privileged point of purchase on them.World City System
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position of cities in a global network and more on the practice of control.
9
Where earlier statements of the world city hypothesis largely assumed the
production and reproduction of control, Sassen proposes that—in the ﬁrst
instance—it is the emergence of a vast range of specialized producer and
ﬁnancial services that makes the global control exercised by ﬁrmspossible.
Thus, in addition to their traditional roles as centers of trade and banking,
world cities “function in four new ways: ﬁrst, as highly concentrated
command points in the organization of the world economy; second, as
key locations for ﬁnance and for specialized service ﬁrms, which have
replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; third, as sites of
production, including the production of innovations, in these leading in-
dustries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations pro-
duced” (Sassen 2001, pp. 3–4).
Sassen (2001, 1994) also stresses that world cities share a similar set of
internal conditions. In addition to their distinctiveroleascentersofcontrol
and of ﬁnance and producer services, world cities exhibit a similar income
and occupational distribution, characterized by sharp and growing po-
larization.
10 For the world city system as a whole, Sassen’s vision issimilar
to Friedmann’s (1986, 1995). The new urban hierarchy generated by glob-
alization cuts across the old divides in the world system. Areas in the
developed world once conceptualized as “core” are being peripheralized,
as cities such as Detroit, Liverpool, and Nagoya have seen their fortunes
decline dramatically. As cities such as Sa ˜o Paulo and Mexico City have
begun to emerge as cities of the ﬁrst rank in the global urban hierarchy,
areas once conceptualized as “peripheral” have joined the core. Alongside
this new urban hierarchy, Sassen (1994) suggests, there exists a “vast
territory” that has been increasingly excluded from the “major economic
processes that fuel economic growth in the new global economy” (p. 4).
As Friedmann does, Sassen argues that globalization is generating a world
system with a fundamentally new and different morphology.
9 As Sassen (2001, p. 6) characterizes her approach in The Global City: “My focus is
not on power, but on production: the production of those inputs that constitute the
capability for global control and the infrastructure of jobs involved in this production.”
10 Similar suggestions are present in Hymer (1972) and Friedmann (1986). Sassen (2001,
1994) goes beyond both in detailing the implications ofthe “globalized,”“postindustrial”
economy of the world city for its residents. While this important aspect of the world
city hypothesis could in principle be readily assessed—one could, e.g., relate changes
in income distribution and occupational structure to the position of cities in the world
city system—research on these sorts of issues has been hobbled by the lack of the sorts
of relational data necessary to generate a ranking of cities that stretches across the
entire global urban hierarchy. One aim of this article is to derive such a ranking.American Journal of Sociology
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DATA AND METHODS
To explore and assess these statements of the world city hypothesis, one
would ideally construct a multirelational network, combining data on
economic, political, social, and cultural linkages between cities. Unfor-
tunately, such data are exceedingly scarce. As a ﬁrst step, then, we have
assembled data on what is typically described in the literature on world
cities as a key relation linking cities into a world system of cities: that
between multinational enterprises and their subsidiaries. Our data consist
of information on the headquarter and branch locations of the world’s
500 largest multinational ﬁrms in the year 2000. Data are drawn from
the Directory of Corporate Afﬁliations (National Register 2000). Of the
500 ﬁrms listed as members of Fortune (2000) magazine’s “Global 500”
in 2000, 446 have full information on headquarterandsubsidiarylocations
in the directory.
11 For each ﬁrm listed in the directory, we coded the
location of the ﬁrm’s headquarters and subsidiaries. The program UCI-
NET 6.0 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman2002)wasthenusedtoconstruct
a directional, valued data matrix from this list. There are a total of 3,692
unique cities in the list, resulting in a 3,692 # 3,692 matrix.
12
Table 1 shows the distribution of the Global 500 across industries, lists
the revenue of ﬁrms in each industry, and gives the total revenue of all
ﬁrms. The Global 500 are distributed across more than 50 industries.
Many of these industries, and the ﬁrms within them, are linked in a value-
added hierarchy. The largest cluster(64 ﬁrms)isinbanking.Thecombined
revenue of the Global 500 totaled more than U.S. $12.6 trillion in 2000.
This was more than twice (208%) the combined gross domestic product
of the world’s 156 poorest societies and equivalent to more than half
(53%) the combined gross domestic product of the 24 member nations of
the OECD in 2000 (World Bank 2002). The activities of the Global 500
thus account for a notable proportion of total world economic activity.
11 The Global 500 are the world’s 500 largest corporations. Of the 54 ﬁrms without
complete information in the Directory of Corporate Afﬁliations, 24 had a headquarter
entry but listed no subsidiaries, 14 were not listed in the directory, and seven were
listed as subsidiaries of other ﬁrms in Fortune’s Global 500. Also excluded from the
data were nine ﬁrms with no subsidiaries outside the headquarter city. The ﬁrms
lacking complete information do not appear to share any particular characteristics
(e.g., were not clustered in any particular industry or region).
12 In cases in which cities are located within the boundaries of a larger metropolitan
area, as deﬁned by the U.S. National Geographic Society (1996), we recoded them as
the metropolitan area (e.g., Courbevoie was recoded as Paris). Information on locations
of suburbs from the National Geographic Society was supplemented with data from
online sources (i.e., Cohen 2002; MapQuest, which we viewed in 2002 at http://
www.mapquest.com/maps/city.adp). Joining suburbs to metropolitan areas in this fash-
ion reduced the number of unique cities in our data set from 5,303 to 3,692.TABLE 1
Distribution of the 2000 Global 500 across Industries
Industry N of Firms
Revenue
($U.S. Million)
Aerospace ............................. 8 189,309
Airlines ............................... 9 127,193
Banks, commercial and savings ....... 64 1,384,355
Beverages ............................. 5 82,591
Building materials, glass .............. 3 47,002
Chemicals ............................. 11 197,567
Computer services and software ....... 2 38,281
Computers, ofﬁce equipment .......... 9 313,800
Diversiﬁed ﬁnancials .................. 6 288,281
Electronics, electrical equipment ...... 22 717,824
Energy ................................ 7 162,756
Engineering, construction ............. 9 156,215
Entertainment ......................... 5 89,093
Food .................................. 10 215,577
Food services ......................... 2 23,294
Food and drug stores ................. 25 552,462
Forest and paper products ............ 6 89,809
General merchandisers ................ 15 471,327
Healthcare ........................... 7 114,298
Industrial and farm equipment ........ 9 180,475
Insurance:
Life,health(mutual) ................ 18 462,720
Life, health (stock) .................. 18 497,128
Propertyandcasualty(mutual)...... 3 77,791
Property and casualty (stock) ....... 14 410,497
Mail, package, and freight delivery .... 8 192,291
Metal products ........................ 3 31,790
Metals ................................ 10 139,361
Mining, crude oil production .......... 5 76,461
Motor vehicles and parts .............. 25 1,216,482
Network communications ............. 3 71,744
Petroleum reﬁning ..................... 26 903,169
Pharmaceuticals ....................... 14 245,412
Publishing, printing ................... 4 50,581
Railroads .............................. 8 110,506
Rubber and plastic products .......... 3 46,362
Scientiﬁc, photo, control equipment ... 3 42,337
Securities .............................. 5 123,381
Shipping .............................. 2 19,831
Soaps, cosmetics ....................... 2 49,576
Specialty retailers ..................... 12 206,487
Telecommunications ................... 21 617,255
Tobacco ............................... 4 111,960
T rading ............................... 20 894,204
Utilities, gas and electric .............. 17 352,123
Wholesalers ........................... 11 213,800
Miscellaneous* ........................ 7 91,204
T otal ............................. 500 12,695,951
* Miscellaneous includesstafﬁng,advertising,tourism,construction,buildingman-
agement, and waste management.American Journal of Sociology
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Power and Prestige in the World City System
We assess the power of world cities in light of three measures of point
centrality (i.e., outdegree, closeness, and betweenness). To understand the
differences between these measures, it may be useful to consider the two
networks illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Assume, for instance, that the relation
illustrated in ﬁgure 1 involves the exchange of resources between cities.
Examining the star network, one would conclude that city A occupies a
favorable structural position, whereas cities B–G occupythesame,equally
unfavorable position. In the circle network, by contrast, all cities appear
equally advantaged or disadvantaged. Why is city A advantaged in the
star network? Freeman’s (1979) now classic treatment of centrality in
social networks suggests three distinct reasons.
Outdegree centrality.—City A in the star network is advantaged be-
cause it is more active than cities B–G. As such, city A has more alter-
natives. If city B refuses an exchange with A, A can rely on resources
from C–G. By contrast, B–G are less active. They are isolated from direct
involvement with others in the network and have no alternatives to
exchange with A. In this sense, city A is more powerful than cities B–G.
In the circle network, by contrast, all cities are equally active and thus
equally advantaged or disadvantaged. With directional data, it is often
important to distinguish between outdegree (ties sent) and indegree (ties
received). With a relation of the sort explored in this paper, the outdegree
of each city is a fairly straightforward measure of power or inﬂuence:
cities that send more ties are cities that have captured more of the control
functions of the world economy (i.e., display more “world city–ness” than
others).
13
Closeness centrality.—City A in the star network is advantaged because
it is closer to more cities than cities B–G. City A is adjacent to all other
cities whereas B–G are two steps from all other cities (except A). Con-
sequently, city A has greater power in the sense that it is more independent
than the others (or, alternatively, in the sense that it can avoid being
controlled by others). For resources to pass from city B to city E, they
must pass through A. In contrast, city A can directly communicate with
13 The outdegree of node (city) ni is simply
  CD
xi   C (n) p , Di g1
where represents the number of ties sent from city i, and is the maximum xg 1 i
possible number of ties linking i to j. Standardization by typically renders the g1
measure as the proportion of all cities sent ties from city i. However, when valued
data are employed, the centrality index may be greater than one. For this reason, we
report the raw outdegree of each city below. (This formula, and those that follow below
are taken verbatim from Wasserman and Faust [1994, p. 199].)World City System
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Fig. 1.—Graphs to illustrate centrality measures
B–G. This gives city A in the star network a distinct structuraladvantage.
In the circle network, all actors are equally close and are thus, again,
equally advantaged or disadvantaged.
In calculating closeness centrality, we transformed the asymmetric, val-
ued matrix used to estimate outdegree centrality into a symmetric, di-
chotomous matrix. We did this for combined substantive and methodo-
logical reasons. Substantively, the nature of the data argues for treating
the matrix as undirected in this instance. To treat the relation between
cities as asymmetric would force the unrealistic assumption that a tie sent
from city A to B does not serve as a pathway of communication from B
to A. Clearly, information ﬂows in both directionsthroughthetiesbetween
headquarter and subsidiary cities. Methodologically, the asymmetric ma-
trix used to estimate outdegree centrality is disconnected on both in- and
out-closeness (e.g., cities with no in- or outdegree are adjacent to no other
cities). This means that closeness centralitycannotproperlybeestimated.
14
Betweenness centrality.—Finally, city A in the star network is advan-
taged because it stands between all the other pairs of actors. It thus has
greater power in the sense that it brokers all exchanges. If city B wishes
to exchange resources with city E, it must do so through city A. City A
14 The closeness of city ni is (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 185)
  CC
g1   C (n) p , Ci g  d(n, n) ij jp1
where is the number of lines in the geodesic linking cities i and j. Closeness d(n, n) ij
can thus be understood as the inverse average distance between city i and all other
cities. Standardization by ensures that closeness equals unity when city i is g1
adjacent to (i.e., one line from) all other cities. The matrix is dichotomized because
the closeness algorithm is insensitive to the value of the geodesic linking cities i and
j (i.e., city i is considered no more or less distant from city j as the value of the lines
connecting them rises or falls).American Journal of Sociology
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thus has the power to coordinate action and to withhold or distort in-
formation to its advantage. This, mirrored by the fact that city A needs
no broker for exchanges with B–G in the star network, gives it a distinct
structural advantage. In the circle network, each city lies between each
other pair of actors, and A–G are, again, equally advantaged or
disadvantaged.
In calculating betweenness centrality, we again use the symmetric, di-
chotomous matrix employed to calculate closeness. Our reasoning is iden-
tical to that discussed above: treating the relation between cities as asym-
metric would force the unrealistic assumption that a tie sent from city A
to B does not serve as a pathway of communication from B to A.
15
Indegree centrality.—While the world city hypothesis emphasizes the
power of world cities, it also suggests that, in addition to being inﬂuential,
world cities are prominent or prestigious: they are sought out by other
cities, have ties directed to them, and are chosen over others. Put differ-
ently, world city–ness involves choices received in addition to choices
made. A simple and straightforward measure of a city’s prestige is its
indegree—the number of ties it receives.
16 Cities that have high indegree
are prestigious in precisely the sense discussed above.
The Structure of the World City System
Having established a ranking of cities in terms of power and prestige, we
employ blockmodeling techniques to abstract from information about in-
dividual cities and to generalize about ties between positions and the roles
played by different sets (blocks) of cities within the world city system. In
essence, blockmodeling involves the grouping together of similar cities,
15 The betweenness of each city ni is calculated as (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p.
  CB
190)
g (n)/g jk i jk
! jk   C (n) p , Bi (g1)(g2)/2
where is the probability that the geodesics g linking cities j and k contain city g (n)/g jk i jk
i. The standardization ensures that falls between zero (when a (g1)(g2)/2 C (n) Bi
given node ni falls on no geodesics) and one (when the ith city falls on all geodesics).
16 We calculate the prestige of city ni as (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 203)
  PD
xi   P (n) p , Di g1
where xi represents the number of ties received by city i, and is the maximum g1
possible number of ties linking i to j. As with outdegree centrality, standardization by
typically renders the measure as the proportion of all cities that choose city i; g1
but with valued data, values greater than one are possible. We thus report the raw
indegree of each city below.World City System
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the description of what makes them similar, and the description of what
makes them different, as a group, from members of other groups (White,
Boorman, and Breiger 1976; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
We use regular equivalence as the criterion for partitioning cities into
positions (White and Reitz 1983; White 1984). The regular equivalence
criterion dictates that cities be assigned to sets composed of cities that
have the same relation to members of other equivalence sets. Forexample,
assume that what is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 is, as in our data, a network
of cities in which the ties are those between headquarters andsubsidiaries,
such that the line from city 1 to city 2 indicates that a ﬁrm headquartered
in city 1 has a subsidiary in city 2. When the regular equivalence criterion
is applied to this network, the maximal regular equivalence partition is
one with three equivalence sets or blocks: block 1, which contains city 1,
block 2, which contains cities 2–4 (equivalent in receiving ties from mem-
bers of block 1 and sending ties to members of block 3), and block 3,
containing cities 5–9 (equivalent in receiving ties from members of block
2 and not receiving ties from members of block 1).
White and Reitz’s regular graph equivalence (REGE) algorithm (1985;
see also Faust 1988) calculates , the degree of regular equivalence
t1 Mij
for cities i and j at iteration , as (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 480) t  1
gR gt t t  max  M ( M  M ) mp1 k m i j rk m r j i rk m r kp1 rp1
t1 M p . ij gR ∗  max  (M a x  Max ) m ijr kmr jir kmr kp1 rp1
The REGE algorithm thus determines how well city i’s ties with city k
match the proﬁle of city j’s ties to city m , weights this by the ( M ) ijr kmr
regular equivalence of k and m from the previous iteration ( ), and
t Mkm
then divides this by the maximum possible value of the numerator. The
numerator would attain the maximum value (one) when all of city i’s ties
could be matched with city j’s ties and all their alters were regularly
equivalent.
World Cities in the World System
Having established a ranking of cities in terms of their power and prestige
in the MNE-generated city system, assigned cities to positions, and gen-
eralized about the roles played by different types of cities within that
system, we conclude by exploring the degree to which the position of cities
in the world city system deviates from a one-to-one matching of cities
onto nation-states in the world system. Do powerful and prestigious cities
cluster in the core of the world system? Is the “dominant” position within
the system likewise monopolized by cities located in the core countries?
Or does the contemporary urban hierarchy cut across the core/peripheryAmerican Journal of Sociology
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Fig. 2.—Graph to illustrate regular equivalence
divide in the interstate system in the fashion suggested by Friedmann
(1986) and Sassen (2001)?
To address these questions, we match each city to its country and assign
it to core, peripheral, or semiperipheral status on the basis of Bollen’s
(1983) revision and update (Bollen and Appold 1993) of the scheme orig-
inally presented by Snyder and Kick (1979).
17 We test for differences by
world system position by estimating a series of ordinary least squares
(OLS) and logistic regressions that relate standing in the urban hierarchy
to location in core, peripheral, or semiperipheral countries. Network data
of the sort we have assembled violate a number of standard assumptions
of regression analysis (e.g., assumptions of random sampling and of the
independence of observations are plainly violated). As such, classical sig-
niﬁcance tests may not be appropriate. We therefore employ a robust
alternative, multiple regression with a “signiﬁcance test” derived from a
17 Information on world system position was not available in these sources for 28
countries: Angola, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Croatia, Djibouti, Estonia, Iceland,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mozambique, Qatar, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. Eleven
of these countries emerged in Eastern Europe after 1989. In these instances, we assign
the new nation the status of its predecessor (e.g., the former Soviet Union was coded
as semiperipheral in Snyder and Kick [1979], and we therefore code Estonia as sem-
iperipheral). For the remaining 17 cases, we assigned world system position on the
basis of the structure of foreign trade (e.g., Burkina Faso shares the proﬁle of other
peripheral African countries and is coded as such).World City System
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permutation test (Good 2000; Borgatti et al. 2002). The procedure that
we use ﬁrst performs a standard OLS or logistic regression. It then ran-
domly permutes the rows of the dependent variable and recalculates the
regression. It does this 1,000 times and produces a P-value that represents
the proportion of random permutations that yield a coefﬁcient as large
as that observed. Thus at the conventional .05 level, one would declare
a coefﬁcient “signiﬁcant” if the proportion of coefﬁcients as large was less
than .05. The regressions and permutation tests were carried out using
the Stata program (Stata Corporation 2002). All other procedures dis-
cussed in this section were carried out using the UCINET program (Bor-
gatti et al. 2002).
RESULTS
Basic statistics and correlations among the various measures of power
and prestige are presented in table 2. Three ﬁndings are worthy of note.
First, the summary statistics indicate that the various measures of power
and prestige are very highly skewed. The distributions of outdegree and
betweenness, for instance, have medians of the lowest possible value.
Consequently, we report nonparametric Spearman rank correlation co-
efﬁcients here and below.
18 Second, outdegree, closeness, and betweenness
are imperfectly correlated. A city’s ranking thus varies depending on
which of the three senses of power discussed above is stressed. Finally,
prestige (as indegree) is positively correlated with the various measures
of power. This means that powerful cities are also typically prestigious
cities; they are sought out and have ties directed to them. The relation
between headquarter and subsidiary cities is thus not exclusively one of
metropolis and satellite (e.g., Hymer 1972). There is a fair degree of def-
erence at work in the world city system as well.
Power and Prestige in the World City System
Outdegree.—Table 3 lists the 50 cities with the largest values on the
various measures of power and prestige.
19 Of the sensesofpowerdiscussed
in the literature on world cities, degree centrality is arguably the most
prominent. World cities are variously deﬁned as “headquarter cities” (Hy-
mer 1972, p. 124), as “basing points in the spatial organization and ar-
ticulation of production and markets” (Friedmann 1986, p. 71), and as
18 Kendall’s t-b, which corrects for ties in the data, yields substantivelyidenticalresults.
19 Information on all 3,692 cities is presented in an appendix, which is available from
the authors on request.American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 2
Spearman Correlation Coefﬁcients and Basic Statistics for Measures of
Power and Prestige
Outdegree Closeness Betweenness Indegree
Outdegree ...... 1.000
Closeness ....... .360 1.000
Betweenness ... .912 .367 1.000
Indegree ........ .793 .518 .731 1.000
Minimum ...... .00 23.75 .00 .00
Maximum ...... 3,639.00 55.51 25.65 1,425.00
Mean ........... 7.82 34.21 .05 7.82
Median ......... .00 34.11 .00 1.00
SD .............. 101.75 3.26 .67 46.56
Note.— . Np 3,639
“concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy”
(Sassen 2001, p. 3). In this sense, outdegree is an unambiguous indicator
of world city–ness: Cities that send more ties are cities that have captured
more of the control functions of the world economy. As noted above, the
distribution of outdegree is highly skewed. The Global 500 are head-
quartered in just 125 cities in 2000. Consequently, 3,567 of the 3,692 cities
in the network send no ties at all (i.e., outdegree p 0). Among the subset
of cities that send ties, outdegree remains highly skewed. At one extreme
stand cities such as Tokyo, New York, Paris, and London, which send
thousands of ties each. At the other stand cities such as Fukuoka (Japan)
and Camp Hill (Pennsylvania) that send just a single tie to other cities.
Does the global urban hierarchy that emerges from these relationaldata
differ substantially from the intuitive or attribute-based rankings that
have proliferated in recent years in the literature on world cities?
20 To
answer this question, table 4 compares our results with two suchrankings.
The ﬁrst is the more or less intuitive ranking proposed by Friedmann
(1995). Thirty cities are grouped under four headings that signal the
breadth of the area articulated by the city. The second is the inventory
of world cities developed by Beaverstock et al. (1999). Consistent with
Sassen’s (2001) deﬁnition of world cities as centers of producer and ﬁ-
nancial services, Beaverstock et al. rank world cities in terms of their
“prime,” “major,” or “minor” status as global service centers in the realms
of accountancy, advertising, banking, and legal services. Cities that score
highest in their coding scheme (i.e., London, Paris, New York, and Tokyo)
are cities that are prime centers in all four sectors. In total, they identify
20 See Beaverstock et al. (1999) for a review of the various rankings of world cities
that have been proposed and a “citation count” of all cities mentioned in world city
research.World City System
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and rank 55 cities. Below each ranking, we report the extent of overlap
between the proposed list and the top 50 cities on each measure (as re-
ported in table 3).
Not surprisingly, agreement is highest at the apex of the global urban
hierarchy. Friedmann, Sassen, and Hymer argue that cities such as Lon-
don, New York, and Tokyo sit at the top of the world city system, and
these cities display, by far, the largest outdegree. There are, however, at
least two surprises at the top. First, Tokyo is far more important than
one would assume on the basis of the literature. While described as a city
of the ﬁrst rank, Tokyo is typically viewed as being eclipsed by London
and New York in power. By the end of the 20th century, this was clearly
not the case. Tokyo’s outdegree is considerably larger than that of London
and New York. According to the results for the two other measures of
power, Tokyo also surpasses London and New York in terms of closeness
and betweenness. Second, despite being characterized by Friedmann
(1995) as only a “national” city, Paris emerges as a city of the ﬁrst rank
by the turn of the century. It eclipses London in terms of outdegree and
also surpasses Tokyo, London, and New York in terms of closeness and
betweenness.
21
Below the top, there are notable discrepancies between the ranking of
cities on outdegree in table 3 and the lists of world cities presented in
table 4. For the Friedmann scheme, 67% of the 30 cities that he identiﬁes
appear among the 50 cities with the largest outdegree.FortheBeaverstock
et al. inventory, just 46% of their 55 cities appear. It is interesting to note
(1) the cities that are identiﬁed as powerful by our network analysis that
are overlooked by Friedmann and Beaverstock et al. and (2) the cities
identiﬁed as powerful by these authors that do not emerge as such in our
analysis. In the case of the former, it is noteworthy that St. Louis, Basel,
and Philadelphia appear among the top 25 cities on outdegree yet receive
no mention in table 4. In the case of the latter, it is striking that cities
such as Miami, Singapore, Mexico City, Sa ˜o Paulo, and Sydney do not
appear among the top 50 cities on outdegree.
22
21 It is unclear to what extent our ﬁndings regarding Tokyo and Paris may be biased
by the type of data we employ. In this regard, it is worth noting that Smith and
Timberlake (2001) and Shin and Timberlake (2000) report very similarresultsregarding
the status of Paris in their network analysis of air travel among cities, whereas Tokyo
appears less prominent than in our data.
22 Perhaps the most notable omissions from table 3 are Miami and Singapore. Both
are typically given a prominent place in intuitive and attribute-based rankingsof world
cities. Singapore is mentioned in nine of the 15 studies reviewed by Beaverstock et al.
(1999), and Miami is mentioned in seven. It is important to note that such cities may
in fact be central to regional city systems (i.e., Asian and Latin American) while, at
the same time, being notably less prominent in the world city system (e.g., Shin and830
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Closeness.—Outdegree centrality identiﬁes as powerful or inﬂuential
those cities that are most active and visible (i.e., send the largest number
of ties). Closeness centrality, by contrast, identiﬁes as powerful those cities
with the shortest paths to others in the network (quantiﬁed as the inverse
average distance between a given city and all others). As one can note in
table 2, power in this sense is only weakly correlated with outdegree.
Paris, Tokyo, London, and New York again emerge as the most central
cities. Below the top, we ﬁnd a rather different ranking of world cities.
Singapore, Mexico City, Sa ˜o Paulo, and Sydney, absent from the top 50
cities on outdegree, now appear. A number of the world cities located in
developing countries identiﬁed by Beaverstock et al. emerge as important
in the closeness analysis: BuenosAires,Caracas,Bangkok,KualaLumpur,
and Beijing. Again, it is interesting to note which cities do not emerge as
important from the network analysis. Miami is again absent, as are Van-
couver, Montreal, and Lyon. Overall, 83% of the 30 cities identiﬁed by
Friedmann appear in table 3, whereas 69% of the 55 cities identiﬁed by
Beaverstock et al. appear.
Betweenness.—Betweenness centrality identiﬁes as powerful those cit-
ies that lie on the paths connecting other cities. Actors with high be-
tweenness have greater power in the sense that they serve as brokers and
can control the ﬂow of information through the network. Table 2 reveals
that betweenness is highly correlated with outdegree, but only modestly
correlated with closeness centrality. As noted above, Paris, by a remark-
able margin, is the most “between” of the major world cities. Du ¨sseldorf,
the ﬁfth most active and sixth closest city, surpasses both London and
New York in betweenness. Interesting results again emerge below the
very apex of the global urban hierarchy. Oslo, Vevey (Switzerland), St.
Louis, Omaha, Basel, and Philadelphia rank among the top 25 cities on
betweenness yet do not appear in table 4. Conversely, Bangkok, Barce-
lona, Singapore, Mexico City, Sa ˜o Paulo, and Sydney (among others) do
not appear in table 3. Overall, 55% of Friedmann’s and 44% of Beav-
erstock et al.’s world cities appear among the top 50 cities on betweenness.
Indegree.—A city’s indegree can be interpreted as an indicator of its
prestige in the sense that cities with high indegree have been chosen over
others. The results for indegree suggest that the handful of cities identiﬁed
as the most powerful are also the most prestigious: New York, London,
Paris, and Tokyo display, by far, the highest indegree. This indicates the
operation of a fair degree of deference in the world city system. The
relation between headquarter and subsidiary cities is not exclusively one
of metropolis and satellite—the head ofﬁce/branch plant structure envi-
Timberlake 2000). The meaning and interpretation of these “discrepancies” are dis-
cussed in greater detail below.American Journal of Sociology
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sioned by Hymer (1972). Instead, less powerful cities actively seek to
establish relations with more powerful cities, consistent with Friedmann’s
(1986) view that cities at the apex of the world city system are used by
global capital as “basing points” in the organization and articulation of
production and markets and with Sassen’s (2001) argument that it is in
these key cities that global control is produced.
The degree of overlap with table 4 is greatest for indegree: 90% of
Friedmann’s and 75% of Beaverstock et al.’s cities appear. This suggests
that there may be a tendency in the literature on world cities to mistake
prestige for power. Consider, for instance, the cities identiﬁed as powerful
by Friedmann (1986) or Beaverstock et al. (1999) that do not appear in
any of the ﬁrst three columns of table 3. It is hard to resist the conclusion
that cities such as Barcelona, Miami, Vancouver, Johannesburg, Jakarta,
Prague, and Shanghai are identiﬁed as “world cities” over the Omahas,
Peorias, and Rochesters of the world—by multiple measures, cities that
in fact appear more powerful—owing simply to the greater prestige of
the former. Indeed, we ﬁnd that all of the former (and none of the latter)
are among the top 100 cities on indegree. So while cities such as Miami
or Shanghai are prestigious, they do not appear to be especially powerful.
Of course, it could be that our data on the MNE network miss important
cultural, social, or political features of the power of such cities. For in-
stance, it is notable that Miami emerges as a very important city in net-
work analyses of air travel performed by Smith and Timberlake (2001)
and Shin and Timberlake (2000). Nonetheless, this apparent tendency to
conﬂate power and prestige suggests that the intuitive and attribute-based
rankings that are so common in the literature on world cities should be
treated with due caution.
The Structure of the World City System
What sort of system is this world city system in which power and prestige
are so strongly skewed toward a small handful of cities? To answer this
question, we employ regular equivalence blockmodeling techniques to
generalize about the structure of the world city system. The regular equiv-
alence criterion dictates that cities be assigned to sets composed of cities
that have the same relation to members of other equivalence sets. For
example, if Susan is the daughter of Jane’s sister and Tess is the daughter
of Lisa’s sister, then regular equivalence dictates that Susan and Tess
form a set (which we label “niece”) because each has a tie to a member
of the set formed by Jane and Lisa (which we label “aunt”). By abstracting
from information on the ties of these four individuals using regular equiv-
alence, we identify two positions in the kinship system (and the data areWorld City System
835
reduced by 50%). In this example, aunts are aunts because they have
nieces and nieces are nieces because they have aunts.
The literature on world cities strongly suggests that regular equivalence
blockmodeling should reveal a world city system characterizedbyasimple
core/periphery structure. In the core, one will ﬁnd those cities that play
the role of “world city.” The cities occupying this position act as “head-
quarter cities” (Hymer 1972, p. 124), as “basing points in the spatial or-
ganization and articulation of production and markets” (Friedmann 1986,
p. 71), and as “concentrated command points in the organization of the
world economy” (Sassen 2001, p. 3). In the periphery, one will ﬁnd those
cities that play the role of “branch plant cities,” cities that are assigned
only the day-to-day activities of the world economy. To the extent that
such a structure exists, (1) cities within the core/headquarter city category
will be adjacent to other headquarter cities, (2) headquarter cities will be
adjacent to some peripheral/branch plant cities, and (3) peripheral/branch
plant cities will not connect with other branch plant cities. In thelanguage
of blockmodeling, the core of the world city system will be a one-block,
the core/periphery region a partial one-block, and the periphery/periphery
region a zero-block—a classic core/periphery structure (Borgatti and Ev-
erett 1999).
In table 5, we list 34 blocks that result from applying the regular equiv-
alence criterion to the MNE-generated city network.
23 The results are
interesting. For one, we ﬁnd that the four most active cities from the
centrality analysis form a regularly equivalent set; that is, London, New
York, Paris, and Tokyo, labeled “L-N-P-T” in table 5, relate to other cities
in the network in an equivalent fashion. These four cities send roughly
37% of the ties that are sent, receive more ties than any other block (about
15% of all ties), and are highly self-reﬂexive: nearly 23% of all the ties
that cities in this block send are received by members of this block. The
next two most active blocks, “Amsterdam” and “Basel” (labeled after the
cities within them that are ﬁrst in alphabetical order), have a similar
proﬁle. Nonetheless, they are different enough in terms of their relations
with other blocks to form distinct sets.
In the last column of table 5, we assign each block to a position in the
network using the typology of positions suggested by Marsden (1989). The
23 In total, 53 blocks emerge at the 75% level of regular equivalence. Nineteen of them
are singleton blocks (i.e., blocks that contain just one city). For the sake of convenience,
we exclude them from the tables, ﬁgures, and discussion in this section and focus on
the 34 nonsingleton blocks. This does not affect the conclusions. We discuss the results
of the 75% regular equivalence partition because they are substantively meaningful,
in addition to representing a manageable reduction. A full regular similarity tree de-
tailing the level at which any two cities are aggregated is available from the authors
on request.American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 5
Block Characteristics and Positions
Block Name gk Out /Out k In /In k Self /Out kk Position
1 .... L-N-P-T 4 37.18 14.61 22.83 Primary
2 .... Amsterdam 11 25.98 11.04 17.47 Primary
3 .... Basel 27 20.49 6.87 15.15 Primary
4 .... Atlanta 13 6.00 13.44 28.79 Primary
5 .... Caracas 16 2.31 4.59 26.28 Primary
6 .... Cologne 6 1.20 .95 12.10 Primary
7 .... Bristol 2 .52 .47 .67 Primary
8 .... Auckland 16 .30 8.65 53.49 High-status clique
9 .... Athens 52 .04 8.64 27.27 High-status clique
10 ... Bochum 12 .01 .55 75.00 High-status clique
11 ... Arnhem 16 4.21 .37 4.85 Low-status clique
12 ... Bartlesville 7 .54 .10 15.92 Low-status clique
13 ... Aachen 79 .00 4.98 .00 Snob
14 ... Brunswick 7 .00 .40 .00 Snob
15 ... Evansville 4 .00 .12 .00 Snob
16 ... Geel 2 .00 .07 .00 Snob
17 ... Genoa 5 .00 .33 .00 Snob
18 ... Aalten 818 .00 3.20 .00 Isolate
19 ... Aarau 86 .00 1.98 .00 Isolate
20 ... Aarschot 394 .00 5.13 .00 Isolate
21 ... Abu Dhabi 95 .00 1.89 .00 Isolate
22 ... Adrian 182 .00 .75 .00 Isolate
23 ... Akita 28 .00 .26 .00 Isolate
24 ... A ˚ lborg 1,493 .00 7.25 .00 Isolate
25 ... Altdorf 136 .00 .52 .00 Isolate
26 ... Amarillo 80 .00 .84 .00 Isolate
27 ... Anderson 3 .00 .02 .00 Isolate
28 ... Bauru 17 .00 .20 .00 Isolate
29 ... Billingstad 11 .00 .16 .00 Isolate
30 ... Bissen 8 .00 .06 .00 Isolate
31 ... Brentwood 23 .00 .55 .00 Isolate
32 ... Cumberland 6 .00 .09 .00 Isolate
33 ... Faridabad 5 .00 .03 .00 Isolate
34 ... Haugesund 8 .00 .13 .00 Isolate
Note.—gk is the number of cities in the block, is the ties sent by the block as a percentage Out /Out k
of all ties sent, is the ties received by the block as a percentage of all ties received, and In /In k
is the self-ties as a percentage of ties sent by the block. Self /Out kk
34 blocks can be assigned to ﬁve types of positions. A total of seven blocks
occupy what Marsden terms the primary position. Primary blocks are
cliques whose members are involved in high levels of relations with out-
siders. More speciﬁcally, they are blocks with greater than expected in-
group preference (their cliquishness), but also greater than expected out-World City System
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degree and indegree.
24 Three blocks—Auckland, Athens, and Bochum
(Germany)—occupy the position of high-status clique. High-statuscliques
are highly cliquish (i.e., have high ingroup preference) and have greater
than expected indegree and lower than expected outdegree. Cities in these
blocks have ties directed to them by the high-status primary blocks, but
they do not reciprocate. Instead, they exchange many of their ties among
each other. The Arnhem (Netherlands)andBartlesville(Oklahoma)blocks
occupy the position of low-status clique. Like high-status cliques, low-
status cliques are cliquish but have lower indegree and greater outdegree
than expected. In other words, these cities are active among each other
but are largely ignored by higher-status blocks in the system.
The next ﬁve blocks occupy what Marsden dubs the snob position.
Snobs have greater than expected indegree but low outdegree and ingroup
preference. Like high-status cliques, snobs are attended tobyhigher-status
blocks, but snobs do not exchange ties with these blocks or among them-
selves (i.e., they do not form a clique). Finally, as one can note, most cities
in the network are in blocks that occupy Marsden’s isolate position. The
A ˚ lborg (Denmark) block, for instance, which contains 1,493 cities, has
lower than expected outdegree, indegree, and ingroup preference. The
cities in these blocks are isolated from one another and play a distinctly
secondary role in the system. They constitute the periphery of the city
system in the sense that all their relations are with members of more
powerful blocks.
Table 6 presents the image matrix that results from applying the a
density criterion to the block-model density table.
25 Rows and columns
have been permuted in accordance with the activity level of each block
in the system. Figure 3 is a graphical representation of this image matrix.
The graphing algorithm that we use arranges the blocks in a two-
dimensional space in a fashion in which attraction is assumed between
24 Marsden (1989) proposes log-linear methods that allow one to assess the strength of
such tendencies. While we use his typology of positions, we do notpursuesuchmethods.
Instead, we assign blocks to positions on the basis of simply whether or not
, , and (see table 5) exceed —cities in a block as a per- Out /Out In /In Self /Out g /g kk k k k
centage of all cities.
25 Speciﬁcally, this means that if intra- or interblock density exceeds the network mean
density, that block is assigneda1i nt h ei m a g em atrix. Otherwise, it is assigned a 0.
The distribution of ties in the network is such (see table 2) that the a density criterion
is nearly equivalent to the zero-block or lean ﬁt criterion originally proposed by White
et al. (1976) in which 0 is assigned only when there are no intra- or interblock ties.
The density table from which the image matrix was constructed is available from the
authors on request.838
TABLE 6
Image Matrix of World City System
1234567891 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
1 . L - N - P - T 1111111111111111
2. Basel 1111111011111101
3. Amsterdam 1111111111111101
4. Arnhem 1111111111111101
5. Atlanta 1111111011111111
6. Caracas 1111111011101101
7. Cologne 1111111011111100
8. Bartlesville 1111111111101010
9. Bristol 1111110011101000
10. Auckland 1111110001101000
11. Athens 1000001000000000
12. Bochum 0000000000010000
13. Aachen 0000000000000000
14. Brunswick 0000000000000000
15. Evansville 0000000000000000
1 6 . G e e l 0000000000000000
17. Genoa 0000000000000000
18. Aalten 0000000000000000
19. Aarau 0000000000000000
20. Aarschot 0000000000000000
21. Abu Dhabi 0000000000000000
22. Adrian 0000000000000000
23. Akita 0000000000000000
24. A ˚ lborg 0000000000000000
25. Altdorf 0000000000000000
26. Amarillo 0000000000000000
27. Anderson 0000000000000000
28. Bauru 0000000000000000
29. Billingstad 0000000000000000
30. Bissen 0000000000000000
31. Brentwood 0000000000000000
32. Cumberland 0000000000000000
33. Faridabad 0000000000000000
34. Haugesund 0000000000000000839
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
111110110101101101
101111110101111111
111110110101101011
101111110110001001
101110111001001001
001110101001011110
101110111100011000
100101100110000001
001100010100000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000
000000000000000000American Journal of Sociology
840
Fig. 3.—Reduced graph of world city system
adjacent blocks and repulsion is assumed between nonadjacent blocks.
26
Blocks occupying the primary position in the network appear in thecenter
of the graph. The L-N-P-T block falls near the center and is surrounded
by the other primary blocks—Amsterdam, Basel, Atlanta, Cologne, Ca-
racas, and Bristol. Auckland and Athens, two of the three high-status
cliques, also fall toward the center of the graph, whereas Bochum is
notably more distant. The low-status cliques, the Arnhem and Bartlesville
blocks, are also closely tied to the center. The snobs—Aachen, Brunswick
(Germany), Evansville (Indiana), Geel (Belgium), and Genoa—are, as a
group, distributed in the space between the center and periphery. Finally,
the 17 isolate blocks occupy a clearly peripheral position, arrayed more
or less evenly around the outskirts of the graph.
What sort of system is the world city system? If one compares ﬁgures
1 and 3, it is apparent that the world city system bears a strong resem-
blance to the maximally centralized star, a network in which a single
node, A, is connected to all other nodes, which, in turn, are disconnected
from each other. The difference in ﬁgure 3 is that there are multiple As.
In fact, examination of ﬁgure 3 and Table 6 indicates that the world city
system comes close to approximating an idealized core/peripherystructure
for a directed relation of this sort (see Borgatti and Everett 1999, esp. ﬁg.
26 The spring embedder available in the UCINET program NetDraw (Borgatti et al.
2002) was used to assign point locations. Spring embedders treat the graphas a physical
system and assume that vertices that are close pull on each other, whereas those that
are distant push one another apart. While they differ in the particulars, all such
algorithms attempt to ﬁnd a solution that minimizes the energy of the system (Eades
1984; Fruchterman and Reingold 1991).World City System
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3). This is a system in which blocks in the core are adjacent to each other
and to some peripheral blocks, whereas blocks in the periphery are dis-
connected from one another. As one can note from ﬁgure 3, blocks in the
center of the graph send to each other and also to most other blocks in
the system, whereas blocks on the outskirts do not send to each other.
Somewhat more formally, if we treat those blocks that occupy Marsden’s
(1989) primary position as the “core” and all other blocks as a “periphery,”
we ﬁnd that the density of the core to core block is much higher than
that of the core to periphery block (0.976 vs. 0.651), whereas the density
of the periphery to periphery block is quite low (0.047). Thus the core to
core block is (nearly) a one-block, the core to periphery block is a partial
one-block, and the periphery to periphery block is (nearly) a zero-block—
a pattern that Borgatti and Everett (1999) characterize as a deﬁning prop-
erty of a core/periphery structure. It is also worth noting that the density
of the periphery to core region is lower than that of the core to periphery
region (0.111 vs. 0.651). This indicates that the blocks occupying the
peripheral position in this structure are less sycophantic than they are
simply passive (White et al. 1976; Burt 1976). The role that they play
looks every bit like that of the “branch plant city” described by Hymer
(1972)—cities that enter the city system only by virtue of the fact that
they are assigned some day-to-day activity of the world economy.
27
World Cities in the World System
What are we to make of the world city system that emerges from the
analysis above? Smith and Timberlake (1995a) have suggested that in
studying the structure of the world city system, “we stand to learn a great
deal more about the nature of the world-system itself” (p. 81). Relations
between cities, they propose, undergird the structure of the world system
and help to reproduce a global economic order that exhibits a core/pe-
riphery structure at the level of the interstate system. As such, we might
expect change in the structure of the world city system to precede change
27 Borgatti and Everett (1999) have developed formal methods for detecting core/pe-
riphery structures. If we use their algorithm to ﬁt such a model to Table 6, we are led
to the same substantive conclusions as above. The overall correlation with an ideal
core/periphery pattern is very high ( ), the core to core block is (nearly) a one- r p 0.941
block (density p 0.900), the core to periphery block is a partial one-block (density p
0.563), and the periphery to periphery block is a zero-block (density p 0.000). The
periphery to core block is less dense than the core to periphery block (0.008 vs. 0.563).
Over the above, the only really notable difference is that the algorithm adds the
Auckland, Arnhem, and Bartlesville blocks to the core, in addition to thesevenprimary
blocks identiﬁed in table 5.American Journal of Sociology
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in the structure of the world system: Any revision of the global hierarchy
is likely to be manifest ﬁrst in the alteration of relations between cities.
The literature on world cities is rich with claims regarding the effects
of the most recent round of globalization on the world system. Friedmann
(1986) and Sassen (2001) argue that the restructuring that the world econ-
omy has undergone in the past two to three decades has generated a new
urban hierarchy that cuts across the traditional divides in the world sys-
tem. To the extent that this is true, we would expect to observe substantial
slippage between the map of the contemporary world city system drawn
out above and the map of the world system. Hymer (1972), in contrast,
thought that globalization would largely reproduce preexisting cross-
national patterns of inequality and dependency. In his view, we should
expect the standing of cities in the world city system to match rather
closely the position of their nation-states in the world system.
To explore the degree to which a new geography of centrality and
marginality may have emerged in recent years, we relate the power and
prestige of individual cities and the position that they occupy within the
city system to the world system position of the countries in which they
are located. As noted above, network data typically violate a number of
standard statistical assumptions. We therefore employ a robustalternative
to standard regression techniques—regression with “signiﬁcance tests”de-
rived from a permutation test (Good 2000; Borgatti et al. 2002). Given
the highly skewed nature of the measures of network centrality, we rank-
transform outdegree, closeness, betweenness, and indegree before per-
forming the regressions. In all models below, we also control for the pop-
ulation of each city. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that cities in the network that
are located in noncore countries are, on average, 10 times larger than
those located in core countries. As we show below, there is a strong re-
lationship between the population or raw demographic prominence of a
city and its power, prestige, and position in the city system. It is therefore
critical that we control for population in testing for effects of world system
position; otherwise any effect of world system position would likely be
confounded by the large differences in average city size across world
system positions.
28
The results for the measures of power and prestige are presented in
table 7. By both a permutation test and a standard two-tailed test, pop-
28 Cities located in core countries have a mean population of 92,202. Cities located in
noncore countries (i.e., in semiperipheral or peripheral countries) have a mean popu-
lation of 910,452. Clearly, the population threshold beyond which cities enter the city
system varies systematically with world system position of the countries in which they
are located.World City System
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TABLE 7
Regression Models of Rank-Transformed Measures of Network Centrality:
OLS Estimates for 3,023 Cities in 2000
Variable Outdegree Closeness Betweenness Indegree
Semiperiphery ....... 303.938***
(6.33)
339.120***
(4.92)
369.473***
(4.99)
604.314***
(6.98)
Periphery ............. 510.030***
(12.10)
516.284***
(8.53)
653.627***
(10.06)
838.403***
(11.04)
Population (log10) ... 341.124***
(19.03)
636.777***
(24.72)
758.320***
(27.43)
1,087.824***
(33.66)
Constant ............. 1,339.92***
(16.66)
990.444***
(8.62)
2,925.87***
(23.72)
3,575.34***
(24.79)
R
2 ..................... .110 .174 .210 .282
Note.—Nos. in parentheses are t scores.
* (permutation tests). P !.05
** P !.01.
*** P !.001.
 (standard two-tailed tests, when different from permutation tests). P !.05
 P !.01.
 P !.001.
ulation (log 10) has a highly signiﬁcant effect in all four models.
29 Larger
cities tend to rank higher on outdegree, closeness, and betweenness than
smaller cities and to rank higher on indegree as well. The position of
cities in the global urban hierarchy is thus correlated with their raw
demographic prominence (see Chase-Dunn and Manning 1999).
World system position is explicitly ordered (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-
Dunn and Grimes 1995). The core region of the world economy is more
powerful than the semiperipheral region, and the semiperiphery is more
powerful than the periphery. Consequently, if the geography of the world
system has not been signiﬁcantly altered in the context of globalization,
we would expect that cities located in core countries will, on average, be
more powerful than cities located in semiperipheral countries. We would
also expect, on average, that semiperipheral cities will be more powerful
than peripheral cities. If the contemporary urban hierarchy cuts across
the traditional divides in the world system, cities should not be ordered
by world system position in this fashion.
The results for outdegree, closeness, and betweenness are consistent
with the former set of expectations. In the case of outdegree, the results
indicate that cities located in semiperipheral countries are, on average,
29 The number of cities in the analysis drops to 3,023 owing to missing data for pop-
ulation. Population data are taken from Cohen (2002). The results presented in table
7 are substantively identical when the untransformed measures of power and prestige
are used. The results are also substantively identical when controls for region (i.e.,
Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin American, and North America) are added to the models.American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 8
Regression Models of Network Position: Logistic Estimates (Odds Ratios) for
3,003 Cities in 2000
Variable Primary
High-Status
Clique
Low-Status
Clique Snob Isolate
Semiperiphery ....... .073***
(5.54)
.493
(1.81)
.225
(1.39)
.282*
(2.99)

6.040***
(6.59)
Periphery ............. .012***
(6.75)
.509
(2.13)

.122
(1.95)
.386*
(3.08)

8.129***
(9.10)
Population (log10) ... 18.689***
(12.33)
6.159
(9.74)

2.187
(2.59)

4.252***
(9.02)
.096***
(17.73)
Pseudo R
2 ............ .347 .180 .035 .109 .258
Note.—Nos. in parentheses are z scores.
* (permutation tests). P !.05
** P !.01.
*** P !.001.
 (standard two-tailed tests, when different from permutation tests). P !.05
 P !.01.
 P !.001.
304 ranks lower on outdegree than cities located in core countries,whereas
cities located inperipheralcountriesare510rankslower.Thesamepattern
is observed for closeness and betweenness: The average rank of cities
located in semiperipheral countries is lower than that of core cities,
whereas that of cities located in peripheral countries is lower still. The
results for indegree, our measure of prestige, are also interesting. We ﬁnd
that cities located in semiperipheral and peripheral countries are, on av-
erage, less prestigious than cities located in core countries.
30 Taken to-
gether, the results presented in table 7 would appear more consistent with
Hymer’s (1972) view of globalization as largely reproducing existingcross-
national patterns of inequality and dependency than with Friedmann
(1986) and Sassen’s (2001) vision of a world city system in the grips of
substantial global restructuring. Rather than cutting across the hierarchy
of states in the interstate system, the contemporary urban hierarchy ap-
pears to map onto it fairly well.
Table 8 presents the results of a series of logistic regressions that relate
the position occupied by cities within the city system to the world system
position of the countries in which those cities are located. By both a
permutation test and a standard two-tailed test, population (log 10) has
a signiﬁcant, positive effect on the odds that a city is a member of a
primary block or of a snob block and a negative effect on the odds that
30 Wald tests indicate that the coefﬁcients of the semiperipheralandperipheralindicator
variables are signiﬁcantly different from one another in all models in table 7.World City System
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it is a member of an isolate block.
31 While population has a positive effect
on the odds of membership in both high-status and low-status cliques as
well, neither coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant by a permutation test.
The versions of the world city hypothesis under consideration yield
clear predictions regarding the composition of the primary and isolate
blocks but are silent on the sorts of cities that one might expect to occupy
the high-status clique, low-status clique, and snob positions. Hymer’s
(1972) vision of the world city system is one in which globalization would
reperipheralize the underdeveloped world as high-level decision making
was further centralized in key cities located in core countries and the rest
of the world was consigned to lower levels of activity. To the extent that
this is true, one would expect that cities located innoncorecountrieswould
be shut out of playing the active, primary role in the system. In addition,
one might expect that peripheral cities would have even lower odds of
membership in a primary block than semiperipheral cities. At the other
end of the spectrum, one would expect that cities located in noncore
countries would be disproportionately conﬁned to the passive, isolate po-
sition and that peripheral cities would have even greater odds of mem-
bership in an isolate block than semiperipheral cities. However, to the
extent that a new urban hierarchy has emerged in recentyears,ahierarchy
that cuts across the traditional divides in the world system, we would not
expect the odds of membership in either block to vary systematically with
world system position.
Again, the results are more consistent with Hymer’s (1972) expectations
than with the alternatives. Being located in a semiperipheral country
rather than a core country signiﬁcantly lowers the odds of primary block
membership, and being located in a peripheral country lowers the odds
even more. On the other hand, being located in a semiperipheral country
raises the odds of isolate block membership by a factor of six, whereas
cities located in peripheral countries are more than eight times as likely
to occupy the isolate position as cities located in core countries.
32 Thus
the odds that a city plays an active or passive role in the world city system
are shaped by the world system position of the countries in which they
are located.
In sum, the results presented in tables 7 and 8 suggest that the position
that nation-states occupy within the world system continues to shape the
power, prestige, and position of cities in the world city system. While the
R
2s and pseudo R
2s reported in the tables are far from 1.0—and thus the
31 The number of cities in the analysis drops to 3,003 owing to missing data on pop-
ulation and, as discussed above, the exclusion of singleton blocks.
32 Wald tests indicate that the coefﬁcients of the semiperipheralandperipheralindicator
variables are signiﬁcantly different from one another in the primary and isolatemodels.American Journal of Sociology
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urban hierarchy certainly deviates from a one-to-one matching of cities
onto nation-states in the world system—it remains the case that the stand-
ing of cities in the world city system is inﬂuenced in an important way
by the position of their nation-states in the world system.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have taken up Smith and Timberlake’s (1993, 1995a,
1995b, 2002) call for more network-oriented analysis of the world city
system. In place of the attributional data typically employed in the lit-
erature on world cities, we assembled data on what we view as a key
relation linking cities into a world system of cities: that between multi-
nationals and their subsidiaries. Our analysis of these data was motivated
by three concrete concerns. First, while numerous rankings of world cities
have been proposed, few have used the sort of relational data that the
world city hypothesis implies are necessary to establish such rankings
empirically. Second, while many have speculated about the structure of
the world city system, no one has demonstrated precisely what sort of
“system” these cities form; nor has anyone detailed the roles played by
different types of cities within that system. Finally, while the literature
on world cities is rich with claims regarding the effects of globalization
on the structure of the world system, no one has systematically explored
the degree to which the position of cities in the world city system might
cut across the traditional divides in the world system.
From our analysis of measures of network centrality, we draw a number
of conclusions. First, as the various versions of the world city hypothesis
predict, we ﬁnd that power and prestige in the world city system are
highly skewed. A small number of cities monopolize power and prestige,
and the world city system forms a fairly strong hierarchy. Second, at the
apex of this hierarchy, there is considerable agreement between our results
and the intuitive and attribute-based rankings that have recently prolif-
erated in the literature on world cities. Cities such as New York, London,
and Tokyo are typically identiﬁed as the most powerful cities, and they
emerge as such in our analysis. Even at the “top,” however, there are
some interesting ﬁndings. Tokyo emerges as being considerablymorepow-
erful than it is typically described. Paris, seen as only an important “na-
tional” city by Friedmann (1995), emerges as a city of the ﬁrst rank. Third,
we ﬁnd that the ranking of cities that emerges from our network analysis
does not completely overlap with the rankings proposed by Friedmann
(1995) and Beaverstock et al. (1999). A considerable proportion of the
cities that they identify as “world cities” do not emerge as such in our
analysis. In their place, we ﬁnd a good number of cities that have beenWorld City System
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heretofore overlooked in the literature, a ﬁnding that we attribute to a
tendency to conﬂate prestige and power. Finally, we ﬁnd that the most
powerful cities are also the most prestigious, indicating the operation of
deference in the world city system.
Using regular equivalence blockmodeling techniques to generalize
about the structure of the world city system, we ﬁnd that the world city
system comes close to approximating an idealized core/peripherystructure
(Borgatti and Everett 1999). This is a system in which blocks in the core
are adjacent to each other and to some peripheral blocks, whereas blocks
in the periphery are disconnected from one another. In the main, the“core”
of the world city system is made up of seven blocks of cities that occupy
a primary position in the network, that is, highly cliquish groups of cities
that are involved in high levels of relations with outsiders (Marsden1989).
The most active of these active blocks in the world city system is the
regularly equivalent set formed by the four cities identiﬁed as especially
powerful and prestigious in the centrality analysis—London, New York,
Paris, and Tokyo. These four cities send roughly 37% of the ties that are
sent and receive about 15% of the ties that are received. The “periphery”
of the world city system is composed largely of the 17 blocks that occupy
the isolate position in the network, that is, internally disconnected groups
of cities that play a passive role in the system. The largest of these, the
A ˚ lborg block, contains more than 40% of the cities in the system yet
receives just 7% of the ties that are received and effectively sends no ties
to other blocks or to others within the A ˚ lborg block. As illustrated in
ﬁgure 3, the blockmodeled city system bears a very strong resemblance
to the maximally centralized “star.”
Our exploration of the question of the degree to which the position of
cities in the contemporary world city system cuts across the traditional
divides in the world system lends support to the position taken three
decades ago by Stephen Hymer (1972). While there is certainly less than
a one-to-one matching of cities onto nation-states in the world system,
the ranking of cities on various measures of power and prestige and the
position that such cities occupy in the city system is nonetheless signiﬁ-
cantly ordered by the world system position of the countries in which
they are located. Moreover, it is ordered in a fashion that is consistent
with the idea that cities located in core countries will, on average, be
more powerful and prestigious and occupy a more active position than
cities located in noncore countries. We ﬁnd little evidence for the new
geography of centrality and marginality discussed by scholars such as
Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (2001). If the world city system does indeed
undergird the structure of the world system and reproduce the core/pe-
riphery hierarchy in the interstate system (Smith and Timberlake 1995a),
these results suggest that claims that the geography of the world systemAmerican Journal of Sociology
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is in the midst of dramatic and fundamental alteration may also be
overdrawn.
In this paper we have taken a step toward mapping the contemporary
world city system. While we believe that we have made some progress
in this regard, there are at least three limitations to the present analysis
that are important to note. First, and most generally, the system that we
describe in this paper, the hierarchy and structure that we observe, should
be compared with data that allow for more culturally, socially, and po-
litically informed senses of the power of cities. Given the paucity of re-
lational data on these dimensions of the world city system, future re-
searchers could explore ways of combining “traditional” data on the
attributes of cities with our relational data. We are currently exploring
such a possibility (Alderson and Beckﬁeld 2002). Second, Friedmann and
Sassen’s arguments regarding the consequences of globalization for the
world city system are fundamentally arguments aboutchange.Theyimply
that there was once a close correspondence between the map of the world
city system and the map of the world system, but that this has been
disrupted by global restructuring. The present analysis, of course, speaks
only to the present ﬁt of the maps, not to the degree of slippage between
the two relative to some point in the past. By collecting the sort of data
that we have collected for an earlier period, future research could test the
longitudinal hypothesis that is implicit in these statements of the world
city hypothesis. We are currently collecting such data. The introduction
of a longitudinal component would also allow investigation of Smith and
Timberlake’s argument regarding the link between the structure of the
urban hierarchy and the world system. Are the two actuallytightlylinked?
Or are the processes that generate the global urban hierarchy largely
independent of those that generate a core/periphery structure in the in-
terstate system? Finally, the ultimate aim of all world city research is, of
course, to say something meaningful about the changing fortunes of cities
and their residents. Future researchers could combine our measures of
power, privilege, and position with, for instance, readily available data
at the SMSA (United States) or NUTS 5 (European Union) levels. With
such data they could rigorously assess arguments in the world cities lit-
erature about how the position of cities in the global urban networkaffects
their fate—the ultimate test of the utility of the new way of thinking on
cities initiated by Friedmann (1986).
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